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Abstract. This article looks at advances and failures of community health in Mali. The work is based upon a 
study undertaken on the ground with community health bodies and their users in the Kayes region. The results 
show that despite the services provided by community health, this can only be a real tool for health under 
certain conditions, mainly involving the role of public bodies in regulating health centres and rebalancing 
their unequal resources.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 1980s, Mali has chosen to develop a commu-
nity health system in which the population uses decentralised 
health structures, as recommended by the Bamako Initiative. 
The country has seen a considerable increase in the number 
of community health centres, CSCOMs for short, from just 
10 in 1993 to 993 in 2009. A CSCOM is a non-proit health 
centre, at the base of the Malian healthcare pyramid. CSCOMs 
are managed by users organised into community health as-
sociations, ASACOs for short (Balique et al, 2001). CSCOM 
staff are recruited for each skill level (healthcare assistant, 
matron, nurse, senior health technician, doctor, etc.) accord-
ing to various statuses. The staff will either be civil servants 
(in the case of staff provided to ASACOs by the district), or 
else be provided by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) funds, or by the ASACO itself. In the irst case, the 
staff have the status of civil servants and so it into a pre- 
established wage structure, while in the second and third 
cases they are contractual staff.
Since the Decree of 4th June 2002, a certain number of 
skills that were provided by the state have had to be provided 
by the districts. However, the development of community 
health centres does not, in principle, signify a reduced role 
for the state. Firstly, the state must provide inancial support. 
Then the state sets regulations for the setting-up and running 
of CSCOMs. An ASACO is recognised if it signs an agree-
ment with the state. This then exempts it from paying any 
taxes, and allows it to obtain grants and receive training. 
This article looks at advances and failures of community 
health work, and is based upon a study undertaken on the 
ground with community health bodies and their users in the 
Kayes region. The issue of the limits of community health in 
a weakened state was raised by Fassin and Fassin (1989) and 
Balique (2001). We reconsider the issue and show that, de-
spite the services provided by community health, the results 
show that this can only be a real tool for health under certain 
conditions, mainly involving the role of public bodies in regu-
lating health centres and rebalancing their unequal resources. 
2 Methodology of the study
This study was undertaken in cooperation with the Association 
for the Coordination of Useful Initiatives in Developing 
Countries, with the aim of assessing dificulties in the operation 
of community health centres in the Kayes region, and how these 
might be resolved. In addition to examining the relevant litera-
ture and documentation, the study of CSCOMs in the Kayes 
region is also based upon a qualitative assessment undertaken 
between 11th may and 19th August 2010 at 16 health centres. 
This study involved 120 people from the following four pro-
iles: CSCOM care staff (48 people interviewed); ASACO 
members (35 people interviewed); district representatives 
(18 people interviewed); patients (19 people interviewed).
The study comprised two parts. The irst part concerned the 
collection from each centre of numerical data on patients and 
the health services available (number of inhabitants, number 
of villages in the health area, type of care provided, geo-
graphical accessibility, cost of services, number of staff per 
category, monthly salary, water and electricity access, etc.). 
A second part, based on semi-structured interviews with 
120 people, aimed to tackle the following ive areas with each 
category of person:
• general presentation of the health centre (history, 
characteristics of its health area, etc.);
• geographical and inancial accessibility, and possible 
obstacles;Correspondence to: Bruno Boidin 
bruno.boidin@univ-lille1.fr
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• operation of the health centre: staff, patient care, activi-
ties undertaken and organisation of the referral system. 
The end-goal was to understand the operation of the 
health centre and to identify the dificulties encoun-
tered and the methods implemented to get around them;
• internal organisation, management and relations with 
the districts; 
• relations with the other players (care providers, associ-
ations, cooperatives, health insurance schemes).  
The study method has a number of methodological limits, 
particularly because the study does not include all of the peo-
ple who might be able to shed some light on operation of the 
health centres and any dificulties encountered, despite the 
variety and number of people questioned. Also, the study was 
focused on the Kayes region and so its results cannot be ex-
trapolated to other regions of Mali. Nevertheless, several 
characteristics of this study allow us to draw wider conclu-
sions. First of all, we have sought to cover the different major 
categories of staff working either in the administration of 
CSCOMs, or in relation with them. Finally, we complete our 
study with an examination of prior documentation.
3 Results: CSCOM deiciencies1
The study allowed us to pinpoint three groups of deiciencies: 
those affecting inance and management; those relating to 
the taking over of the running and management of ASACOs 
by the beneiciaries; more general deiciencies relating to 
the decentralising of administrative and health services 
in Mali. The following results relate to the irst kind of 
dificulty (inancing and management) and the third kind 
(decentralisation).
3.1 Financing and management dificulties
Three dificulties were identiied as causes of the deiciencies 
in inancial and management resources. They all related to 
management in the wider sense of the word: management and 
motivation of human resources, raising and securing of fund-
ing, or even budgeting capabilities.
3.1.1 Management and motivation of human  
resources and volunteer agents
The status and remuneration of staff in the health centres
The lack of a work contract (with its associated payments 
into a pension fund) is one of the dificulties encountered by 
the care staff. There is a particularly high number of staff 
without contracts in the Diéma Circle. The staff concerned is 
that of the ASACO and the district. According to the Regional 
Social Development Department, in 2009, the ASACOs of 
the Kayes region employed 747 people, yet only 260 of them 
were registered with the National Social Security Institute 
1 For reasons of editorial standards, the interview questions and results 
are not presented in detail here.
(responsible for pensions and health coverage), that is to say 
a little under 35%. In spite of complaints from staff, the situ-
ation has remained blocked for several reasons: the monthly 
salary is too low to be declared to the National Social Security 
Institute, and the employer does not wish to raise salaries; 
according to the staff questioned, the voluntary lack of a con-
tract on the part of the municipality or of the ASACO allows 
them to retain a certain control over the staff; the district or 
the ASACO does not want to or cannot pay contributions to 
the National Social Security Institute; the employers, most of 
whom are members of the community and farmers, have an 
informal approach to life. 
There are major differences in salary between the CSCOMs, 
as well as in relation to the collective agreement, which is not 
always respected. The average monthly salary of managers 
in the CSCOMs studied is 41,000 CFA francs, which is 
19,000 CFA francs less than the amount speciied in the 
agreement. The lowest salary is 15,000 CFA francs, while the 
highest is 69,000 CFA francs. There are major remuneration 
disparities between the heads of the medical centres. The 
amount paid is not always commensurate with the diploma 
level: a nurse may be paid more than a doctor. The salary de-
pends on the status of staff on one hand (notable differences 
can be seen between civil servants and contract staff, including 
prospects for raises), and a direct negotiation between the em-
ployee and the ASACO on the other hand. In addition, this 
wage may be complemented by bonuses, also negotiated be-
tween the employee and the ASACO on a case by case basis 
according to criteria relating to the proper operation of the cen-
tre or even the reputation of the head of the medical centre. 
Salary arrears are a second major problem. Payment difi-
culties are linked either to the ASACO or to the district. The 
responsibilities of the people concerned are not clearly estab-
lished, making any recourse uncertain:
• the district encounters great dificulties in collecting 
taxes; 
• the ASACOs generally link the payment of salaries to a 
centre’s results. 
• diversion of funds on the part of the ASACO or the dis-
trict have been reported in certain centres, without this 
necessarily being the fault of the current staff. 
The lack of qualiied agents for each task encourages the 
staff to exceed their primary skill: an injection turns a health-
care assistant into a nurse, while a prescription elevates a 
nurse to doctor status. This adaptation to constraints appears 
necessary, since it allows the staff to guarantee health ser-
vices that are essential to the population. Yet it is character-
ised by “the partial abandonment of the agent’s main role”, 
as Konate et al. (2003) have already noted. 
 
The dificult mobilisation of community relay agents
The voluntary community relays have become key players in 
African community health policy, particularly under the aegis 
of UNICEF. Generally appointed by village notables, the re-
lays must actively participate in the so-called Behaviour 
Change Communication (BCC) strategy.
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In the region studied, the community health agents were 
responsible for a major proportion of health policy in a con-
text where structural adjustment plans and the economic 
slump have reduced the importance of the state in social pol-
icy. Yet the success of such programmes varies according to 
country and to period. In Benin (Boidin, Savina, 1996), the 
decentralisation of the health system under structural adjust-
ment ran up against the dificulty of mobilising human re-
sources in rural areas. The economic constraints of health 
staff seem to be incompatible with the idea of volunteer ac-
tivities, whether they be paid in kind or through social recog-
nition. More recently, in Senegal, the ight against malaria 
has seen major advances in the home-treatment of malaria 
patients (PECADOM), supported in part by the commitment 
of the local communities, and particularly the role of home-
care providers (DSDOM) – volunteer agents chosen by the 
village and who were paid during their training. Our study 
reveals that, in Mali, the importance of community health 
agents is now limited, compromised even, following an ini-
tial period of mobilisation. The people carrying out the role 
of relays have encountered dificulties in devoting the neces-
sary time to this activity, in light of the required economic 
compromises. In all of the health areas studied, the health 
staff felt that the health relays were not really undertaking 
their tasks properly. Quite apart from the dificulty of mobil-
ising people lacking remuneration, the non-renewal of volun-
teer agents seriously threatened the longevity of the system. 
Finally, the relays ran into dificulties related to illiteracy, 
which made it impossible to refer sick people to the health 
centre or to record and register births. 
3.1.2  Raising and securing of funding
The dificulty in collecting social security payments 
In accordance with the pyramidal structure in place, patients 
requiring more advanced treatment than that available at the 
CSCOM must be referred to another health centre that is 
equipped to care for them. The Malian state initially concen-
trated on obstetrical emergencies. Each administrative area, 
or ‘circle’ has a social security scheme set up to cover referral 
costs: fuel, drivers, ambulances, maintenance, repairs, etc. 
Each scheme is funded by the ASACOs, the ‘circle’ councils 
and the districts; a share of these costs must be paid each year. 
In the CSCOMs included in the study, three out of eight 
ASACOs were not paying their shares, nor were three-quar-
ters of the districts. The result is that the patients of three out 
of ive CSCOMs do not receive free referral trips to the refer-
ral centre, but must put up at least half the costs. For some 
centres, the cost may be as high as 50,000 CFA francs, given 
the distance between the CSCOM and referral centre. 
The ASACOs have set up various methods to enable them 
to pay their shares:
• implementation of a collection system in the villages of 
a particular health area. Every year, the community as-
sociation is informed of the total amount of the share to 
be paid. It then divides up this amount between the vil-
lages in that health area. Each village chief decides 
which method to use: a set amount per family, or a tax 
on each person. Once the sum has been collected, the 
village chiefs pay their dues to the ASACO, which has 
generally advanced some of the costs, thanks to the 
consultation fund.
• implementation of a system of payment upon consulta-
tion; each patient of the CSCOM pays for their consul-
tation plus a supplement;
• withdrawal of the sum from the consultation fund, 
without any subscription or special tax. 
Of these three methods, only the second is recognised as 
being effective is terms of contribution collection, but it is 
only applied in a single CSCOM, at Gory Gopéla. The sup-
plement, which appears on each prescription, is not opposed 
by the population of the health area and allows the ASACO to 
build a fund for referrals. The irst system (annual fee) is a 
failure. Collection is effective for the irst few years, but then 
drops off. Interviewees mentioned a considerable reticence 
on the part of households, owing to a lack of knowledge 
of how the collected sums were used. The third system, in-
volving withdrawals from the consultation fund, is a simple 
method, but of limited effectiveness according to the manag-
ers of the centres questioned, given the low level of use of 
some CSCOMs. 
The explanations sketched out here must be put into per-
spective with the studies that look at the reasons why health 
insurance schemes tend not to be used in poor countries. 
Defourny and Failon (2011) provide several explanations that 
are common to several geographical study areas. The precari-
ousness of some people’s lives prevents them from making 
plans for the future and seeing the point of contribution or 
insurance schemes; a focus on the here and now makes pa-
tients reluctant to pay twice – once for a contributory sub-
scription, and again for the consultation itself, even at a lower 
rate; luctuations of income, not to mention  its generally low 
level, require considerable lexibility in the collection and pe-
riodicity of such payments; awareness campaigns are insuf-
iciently developed and suited to rural populations. These dif-
ferent explanations faithfully relect the conditions in which 
social security schemes operate in the region we studied. 
They certainly help to explain the dificulties encountered by 
the ASACOs.
The districts no longer properly guarantee payments into 
the social security schemes. Elected representatives and civil 
servants unanimously state that the district does not have suf-
icient funds. The municipalities of the Diéma Circle are the 
ones who make the most contribution to the social security 
scheme. However, their collection rate was only 17% for 
2009. The tax is dificult to collect and what income there is 
does not cover all of the costs. 
The more general dificulty of inancing
Legal texts entrust the management of a CSCOM to its 
ASACO. The association’s income is exclusively composed 
of funds collected by the health centre, thanks to the pricing 
of consultations and the sale of medicines. However, 
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technical or material support is provided to certain CSCOMs. 
The state and its partners (international organisations) 
provide:
• the irst stock of medicines, a motorcycle and a refrig-
erator when the CSCOM is set up;
• some inputs (vaccines), mosquito nets (distributed by 
the centre to pregnant women and vaccinated children 
free of charge), nutritional products (lour and oil re-
ceived from the World Food Programme) and possibly 
some furniture (chairs, beds, etc.).
In spite of their lack of resources, some districts participate 
by inancing (in certain centres) the wages of some of the 
staff and even water and electricity bills. They provide tech-
nical support to the ASACO in putting together funding 
applications.
But the CSCOMs mainly depend on their own resources, 
despite this targeted aid. Some centres also beneit from 
the contributions of migrants, which can create inequalities 
between centres, as we will see.
3.1.3 Ad hoc management style  
According to the law, the CSCOMs must respect the separa-
tion between the medicines fund, composed of revenue from 
the sale of medicines, and the consultation fund, whose rev-
enue comes from the payment of consultations. Five ASACOs 
recognise that they are unable to guarantee the operation of 
the centre using the revenue from consultations, so they dip 
into the medicine fund. The problem is how to restock prod-
ucts, for this is only possible if the withdrawals made do not 
exceed the amount made from sales. Otherwise, the value of 
the stock depreciates and the ASACO must call upon outside 
assistance to restock the products. 
It is dificult to judge if the other centres make a separation 
between the two funds. The treasurer often keeps the money 
at their home, and so the sums paid into the bank accounts do 
not always correspond with the true amounts saved. 
In addition, there is almost no management monitoring. No 
budgets are drafted for the coming year, and the statement for 
the past year often shows nothing but the value of the stock of 
medicines and the money held in the bank. All of the manage-
ment is left up to the manager, who keeps a daily track of the 
centre’s income (and sometimes expenditure). The weekly 
and monthly statements are drafted by the head of the medi-
cal centre and the treasurer. According to the texts, the ad-
ministrative secretary should usually retain the accounting 
archives, while the treasurer is responsible for current ac-
counting documents. This is not actually what happens, and 
there are few ASACO members who have the monitoring 
documents.
3.2 Decentralisation and institutional deiciencies
3.2.1 Limits of decentralisation
The irst district elections took place in 1999, following the 
implementation of decentralisation in the 1990s. 500 new 
districts were planned, according to the village inclusion 
criteria; in fact, 700 were created. This difference is partly 
explained by the unclear nature of certain criteria. Not all 
of the districts visited had the 20,000 inhabitants required 
by the village inclusion criteria. Low population numbers 
and income levels (owing to farming work) means that it is 
dificult in rural areas to collect the tax, a district’s main 
revenue, and to cover the many costs. The wages of the 
district staff come directly from the proper collection of 
taxes. Yet tax collection is dificult and costly and the mu-
nicipal teams blame the state’s disengagement. In 1999, 
during the irst mandate, the state gave 2 million CFA 
francs per quarter. Today, this has dropped to 100,000 CFA 
francs per quarter. The districts ind themselves dealing 
with a skills transfer, without training and without addi-
tional inancial support. 
In the course of our study, we interviewed 18 representa-
tives of the eleven different districts in the Yélimané, Kayes 
and Diéma Circles. In nearly all of the districts, the role of the 
municipality in the area of health is not known. In nine dis-
tricts where we were able to get information, only three were 
contributing to the referral fund. With ASACOs having been 
set up, the districts did not always make health one of their 
priorities. Some elected representatives clearly indicated a 
preference for inancing visible initiatives such as the build-
ing of a school, rather than employing a new matron or pay-
ing their share of the referral fund. 
In light of the dificulties and the accumulated delay in re-
lation to the legal texts, the district team of the town of Kayes 
set up a health commission in late 2009. This has 11 mem-
bers, all of them elected volunteers. Its major task was ini-
tially to make contact with the different health stakeholders 
(care staff of the CSCOMs and the hospital, the ASACO and 
decentralised state services), to study the texts and to specify 
its role. However, this commission was not supported by the 
decentralised state services. According to the chairman of the 
commission, this situation may be explained by the fact that 
the technical services would fear that the district might take 
over all health issues. 
The ASACOs operate relatively autonomously compared 
with the districts and the state services. 
3.2.2 One consequence: disparity of human  
and technical resources 
Seven of the sixteen centres visited are run by a doctor, eight 
by a nurse and one by a healthcare assistant. We noted that 
there is no apparent link between the number of villages in 
the health area and the role or status of the head of the centre. 
Some CSCOMs covering a large number of villages are 
therefore run by a nurse, while others covering a smaller 
number are run by a doctor. Half of the CSCOMs are in 
charge of a health area covering more than ive villages. In 
addition, the size of the population covered by the health 
area does not seem to be a criterion that would explain the 
status of the head of the centre, even though we should men-
tion that the three centres covering the largest population 
(Dioumara, Kayes N’Di, Khasso) are run by doctors (but 
some are run by nurses covering a larger population than 
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other centres run by doctors). Finally, if we look at the num-
ber of inhabitants per health agent, we note a very large dis-
parity between the centres.
Access to water and electricity is also disparate. Ten out of 
sixteen CSCOMs have access to electricity. In urban areas, 
the centres are connected to the electricity network, while ru-
ral infrastructures get their energy from solar panels. Eight 
out of the thirteen rural CSCOMs studied have no access to 
water within the health centre itself. 
3.2.3 The role of migrants: assistance which  
has ambiguous effects
Fund transfers by migrants constitute a non-negligible re-
source for the health centres, partly compensating for the 
deiciencies in public and community funding. The Kayes 
region is special in this respect, given the large number of 
migrants behind the transfer of funds. But beyond the ben-
eicial inancial effects, the role of migrants can lead to some 
imbalances between health centres and a particular interpre-
tation of the “community”. In a rural area, more than half of 
the CSCOMs have beneited from support on the part of mi-
grants in the shape of construction or rehabilitation of prem-
ises housing the centre, or of various kinds of funding. 
These are often migrants who are called upon to provide the 
share of investment that should be provided by the commu-
nity. In some cases, they do not participate directly, but 
enable the obtaining of funding from NGOs or local govern-
ment in the North. 
More than half the heads of medical centres questioned, 
who were not from Kayes, told us of the potentially negative 
effects that this sending of money could have, in their view. 
The migrants left their villages a number of years ago, but 
feel that they know the health priorities. When a major deci-
sion needs to be taken at a CSCOM, such as hiring another 
matron, some heads of medical centres are forced to go 
through not only the ASACO, but also the migrants. As a re-
sult, the populace is not involved in the ASACOs, since they 
know they can count on the migrants, who respond to re-
quests for money.
4 Discussion: the missing links between  
 the institutional players
As has been underlined by several economic and political au-
thors, the decentralisation promoted by funders and develop-
ment aid players, does not seem to be a panacea in a context 
of weak centralised or non-democratic states and poor econo-
mies. Cartier-Bresson (2010) repeats the arguments of 
Platteau (2004) and other works (International Social Science 
Journal, 1998) which show that decentralisation is only op-
erational in rich, democratic and paciied societies. Mali is 
indeed democratic, but it illustrates the dificulties of imple-
menting decentralisation in such a context. This is a good ex-
ample of the inherent risks of experimenting with decentrali-
sation of the health system in a context where neither the 
place of the state nor administrative decentralisation is strong 
enough or established. All in all, we highlighted three sources 
of community health deiciencies, based on the area studied.
The irst source of deiciency is the diversity of health 
areas, be that in terms of external funding (which reveals the 
major role played by migrants), or the involvement of staff 
and local populace. Inequalities may therefore come from the 
local level.
The second source of deiciency, still at the local level, is 
the ambiguous relationship between the district and the 
ASACO: is the district becoming the governing body of the 
community association, or not? Since 2002, legal texts have 
established that some of the role exercised by the state in the 
past is now granted to the districts. Central power retains 
the tasks of supervising and developing national directions 
in terms of health. But in actual fact, this transfer has not 
occurred. Elected oficials and district technicians alike do 
not appear to be applying the texts on the ground, even when 
they are familiar with them.    
This ambiguity is partly linked to the time gap between the 
decentralisation of the state’s competences to the ASACOs 
and the decentralisation towards the districts: the irst pre-
cedes the second. In a study dating from 2002, dealing with 
the “issue of the community management of health structures 
at the operational level (CSCOM, CSREF) in the context of 
decentralisation”, the Regional Health Department men-
tioned the dificult collaboration between ASACOs and the 
local authorities. The report highlighted the fact that the 
stakeholders were not very familiar with the texts, hence the 
confusion of roles and individual responsibilities.
Finally, the third deiciency comes from the relationships 
between local stakeholders (the health area, symbolised by 
the district, the ASACO and the population) and global play-
ers (states, NGOs, international organisations). The former 
are ripe for considerable actions on the part of the global 
players. But interventions by the latter are responses to differ-
ent plans and motivations, and are not homogenous. 
International organisations do not act in all health areas in an 
equal manner (as can be seen in the case of lour distribution 
by the PAM), just like NGOs or the state. The diversity of 
interventions risks reinforcing certain inequalities of access 
between the health areas. The Malian state is not playing its 
role of arbitration and territorial rebalancing as regards these 
issues. The public authorities are thus a weak link in the de-
centralisation of health. The deiciencies of the Malian state, 
mentioned previously by other authors (Fassin and Fassin, 
1989, Balique, 2001, Balique et al, 2001), have not been ab-
sorbed and so contribute to limiting the improvement of the 
health system. 
All in all, the decoupling of the promotion of community 
health from the administrative decentralisation of public 
stakeholders has led to problems of coordination and deini-
tion of responsibilities. The conditions for the improvement 
of the community health system would seem to lie in the 
strengthening of territorial authorities and adherence to the 
programmes of the Ministry of Health and the Ministries in 
charge of relations with the territorial authorities.
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